The Code-Based Interpretation of Authorization: An Incomplete Picture by Ulrich, Nicholas R.
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts
Volume 10 | Issue 3 Article 4
1-1-2015
The Code-Based Interpretation of Authorization:
An Incomplete Picture
Nicholas R. Ulrich
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nicholas R. Ulrich, The Code-Based Interpretation of Authorization: An Incomplete Picture, 10 Wash. J. L. Tech. & Arts 221 (2015).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol10/iss3/4
WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS 
VOLUME 10, ISSUE 3 WINTER 2015 
 
THE CODE-BASED INTERPRETATION OF AUTHORIZATION: 
AN INCOMPLETE PICTURE 
 
Nicholas R. Ulrich* 
© Nicholas R. Ulrich 
 
Cite as: 10 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 221 (2015) 
http://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace-law/handle/1773.1/1435 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The definition of authorization under the Stored 
Communications Act raises questions about implied 
authorization in situations where someone fails to secure an 
email account properly. The few cases that have addressed 
this issue under the federal act or its state equivalents have 
not created a bright-line rule. Instead, the question of 
authorization has been highly fact-dependent. Two leading 
interpretive theories have emerged on the question of 
authorization: the code-based theory and the trespass theory. 
While the code-based interpretation of authorization seems 
pleasing because it appears to provide highly predictive 
outcomes, it fails in some circumstances. This failure is 
especially obvious when someone inadvertently and 
unintentionally gives someone else permanent access to an 
email account by, for instance, saving their username and 
password in the browser of a shared computer. Courts 
interpreting cases in this context implicitly reject the code-
based interpretation of authorization, which would provide 
no remedy, in favor of the trespass theory. Ultimately, the 
code-based model does not provide enough flexibility to fit all 
situations in which the courts wish to provide a remedy. The 
best test, therefore, involves aspects of both theories. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
At a time where anything and everything is done online, and 
when our computer, phone, or tablet can store all of our private email 
accounts and passwords, when do we implicitly grant someone else 
authorization to access that information? The question is not as clear-
cut as some would like to think. There are two models of interpreting 
the ultimate question of what constitutes authorization under the 
federal Stored Communications Act (“SCA”): the code-based theory 
and the trespass theory. The code-based theory relies on whether the 
user bypasses code-based protections of the computer or system, 
whereas the trespass theory analogizes to trespass law to determine 
implied authorization. Depending on the facts of the case, the 
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outcome may necessarily be different depending on which model is 
used. While the code-based theory is growing in popularity, it fails to 
provide a remedy in all cases where society and the courts appear to 
see the need for one. In those circumstances, the courts implicitly 
reject the code-based interpretation in favor of the more fluid trespass 
model, often leaving the ultimate determination of implied 
authorization to the jury. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
As technology developed, privacy protection laws needed to as 
well. A wiretap statute that only penalized voice interception proved 
inadequate once communications started becoming electronic and 
digital.1 Further, courts lacked guidance as to what extent common 
law protections extended to electronic communications. Recognizing 
these problems, Congress passed the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (“ECPA”) in 1986.2 This Act expanded the Wiretap Act 
to include the “interception” of electronic communications.3 Congress 
also recognized that electronic communications are not always in 
transit; service providers also place them in temporary storage.4 The 
ECPA, therefore, included the Stored Communications Act to protect 
communications in electronic storage.5 
 
A.  The Stored Communications Act 
 
Congress passed the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) to 
extend privacy protections to electronic communications stored on a 
server that provides email or other electronic communication 
service.6 The Act provides that whoever “(1) intentionally accesses 
                                                                                                             
1 See United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977) 
(recognizing that the Wiretap Act only applies where there is “aural acquisition of 
the contents” of a message). 
2 See generally, H.R. REP. NO. 99-647 (1986); Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848. 
3 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2008), with Wiretap Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-
351, Title III, § 802, 82 Stat. 213. 
4 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22 (1968). 
5 Id. 
6 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986). 
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without authorization a facility through which an electronic 
communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an 
authorization to access that facility . . . shall be punished . . . .”7 
The classic problem Congress designed the SCA to address is 
when an individual hacks into an email provider and reads another 
individual’s emails. As one departs from the archetypal example, 
however, the analysis becomes more complicated. This Article does 
not attempt to answer the ultimate question of when a person can and 
cannot implicitly have authorization. Instead, this Article attempts to 
demonstrate the highly fact-dependent nature of the inquiry. 
 
B.  Civil Cause of Action 
 
The SCA provides for a civil cause of action, which allows 
persons who are “aggrieved” by the violation of the SCA to recover 
damages from the violator.8 Notably, the civil cause of action requires 
a lesser mens rea: from intentional to either “knowing or 
intentional.”9 The SCA also guarantees a minimum of a $1,000 
recovery, grants the court power to award the prevailing party costs 
and attorney’s fees, and allows for the possibility of punitive damages 
if the conduct was “willful or intentional.”10 
 
C.  State Statutes 
 
Certain states have adopted comparable statutes to the SCA.11 For 
example, New Jersey expanded its Wiretap Act to include language 
equivalent to that of the federal SCA.12While New Jersey’s version 
has a different grammatical structure than its federal counterpart, the 
                                                                                                             
7 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2002). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. § 2707(c). 
11 The following is a non-exhaustive list of states that have some variation of 
the SCA: Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See 1 ROBERT D. BROWNSTONE & TYLER G. NEWBY, 
DATA SEC. & PRIVACY LAW § 9:47, at 1 n.1 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-27 
(West 2013). 
12 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-27 (West 2013). 
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phrasing and requirements are virtually identical.13 Further, New 
Jersey’s version of the SCA also provides for a civil cause of action 
for a violation by any person “aggrieved by any violation” of the 
Act.14 Due to these similarities, it is not surprising that New Jersey 
courts interpret the federal and state versions similarly, and they look 
to federal precedent when questions arise as to the New Jersey Act’s 
scope.15 Likewise, federal courts occasionally consider state decisions 
on state equivalents to the SCA.16 
 
II. COURTS APPLY TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF AUTHORIZATION 
 
Authorization is, by its very nature, a fact-specific inquiry. Even 
in the single context of email, several different factual variants arise 
requiring different approaches and interpretations. Courts use one of 
two predominant theories to determine whether a person accessed the 
communications with authorization.17 The first, code-based 
interpretation is growing in popularity but does not provide enough 
versatility to the courts to meet the varied situations where a remedy 
is appropriate. The trespass model is, in comparison, much more 
versatile but makes predicting outcomes more challenging. 
 
A.  The Code-Based Interpretation is Narrow in Scope 
 
The code-based approach, at its most basic, prohibits access 
where a person “bypasses [the] code-based protections designed to 
limit his use of the computer system.”18 This happens commonly 
                                                                                                             
13 Compare id., with 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2002). 
14 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-32 (West 1993). 
15 See White v. White, 344 N.J. Super. 211, 218–22 (2001) (recognizing the 
similarities between the SCA and New Jersey’s Act and applying federal precedent 
to interpret New Jersey’s Act). 
16 See, e.g., Lazette v. Kulmatycki, 949 F. Supp. 2d 748, 754 (N.D. Ohio 2013) 
(considering and distinguishing two state cases). 
17 The concept of authorization is not limited to the SCA. The Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008) (“CFAA”), also deals with the issue. 
Courts interpret authorization the same under both acts. See Theofel v. Farey–
Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (referring to discussion of authorization 
under SCA when considering authorization under CFAA). 
18 Katherine Mesenbring Field, Comment, Agency, Code, or Contract: 
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when someone determines the password using a password-cracking 
computer program, but also covers others situations, such as where a 
person hacks around a password barrier or other security device, or 
uses social engineering to trick someone into disclosing their 
password to the hacker.19 Though this approach covers a wide swath 
of activity, it is still narrow in that only limited types of conduct 
constitute code-based violations. 
One reason for using this approach is clarity. Another is that it 
limits the number of situations that would constitute a violation of the 
SCA. Recognizing that statutes like the SCA impose criminal 
liability, some argue that the rule of lenity20 should apply to require 
this narrow interpretation of authorization.21 Therefore, this method 
of understanding authorization limits liability to when someone 
explicitly tricks a computer system or uses deceit to induce a human 
into giving more information or privileges than the person otherwise 
would have.22 
 
B.  The Trespass Theory is a More Fluid Model 
 
Another, more fluid theory of interpreting authorization involves 
linking violations to the tort of trespass. This theory operates mainly 
by analogy between trespass law and computer systems.23 In Theofel, 
the court found a violation of the SCA when a company sought to 
execute a clearly invalid subpoena on an email provider.24 After 
recognizing that the SCA serves a comparable role to the tort of 
                                                                                                             
Determining Employees' Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 819, 825 (2009). 
19 Id. 
20 The Rule of Lenity requires that ambiguous laws imposing criminal liability 
be interpreted in favor of the defendant when their ambiguity cannot be clarified 
through traditional means of statutory interpretation. See Bell v. United States, 349 
U.S. 81, 83–84 (1955). 
21 See Warren Thomas, Comment, Lenity on Me: LVRC Holdings LLC v. 
Brekka Points the Way Toward Defining Authorization and Solving the Split over 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 379 (2011) (arguing for 
lenity to be applied in interpreting authorization under the CFAA). 
22 Field, supra note 18, at 825. 
23 See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey–Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Theofel is the leading and arguably first case to apply the trespass model. 
24 See id. at 1074. 
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trespass, the court examined a number of situations of trespass to 
determine the question of mistaken authorization.25 
The Theofel trespass theory is softer in the sense that it does not 
have the rigidness of the code-based interpretation, which looks to 
explicit conduct bypassing the computer protections. As such, it is 
better able to capture situations where the code-based interpretation 
fails to address society’s normative intuitions. It covers the situation, 
for instance, when someone forgets to secure his or her system and an 
intruder takes improper advantage of the situation to intrude on the 
personal privacy of the computer’s owner.26 
 
III. IMPLIED AUTHORIZATION IS MORE COMPLICATED THAN THE 
CODE-BASED INTERPRETATION ALLOWS 
 
Even within the restricted context of implied authorization to 
access someone’s email, different factual scenarios yield different 
results. Further, the courts do not always follow the code-based 
interpretation, even when it would produce a definitive answer to the 
question of authorization. 
 
A.  The Context in which an Email Account is Inadvertently Left 
Open Demonstrates the Incompleteness of the Code-Based 
Theory of Authorization 
 
When someone inadvertently leaves an email account open, and 
the next user of the computer stumbles across it, the second user does 
not violate the SCA by looking at the emails.27 This result is obvious 
under the code-based interpretation. Despite this fact, some courts do 
not take the easy path by deciding the issue as a matter of law and 
ultimately leave the question to the jury to answer as a matter of 
                                                                                                             
25 See id. at 1072–73 (noting the distinction between a nosy neighbor who 
deceives her way into a person’s home by posing as a meter reader and a wire-cop 
who only conceals that he intends to repeat what he hears). 
26 See Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized Access, Trespass and 
Privacy, 62 BUS. LAW. 1395, 1420 (2007) (arguing the insufficiency of the code-
based model). 
27 See, e.g., Marcus v. Rogers, A-2937-09T3, 2012 WL 2428046 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. June 28, 2012); Doe v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 835 F. Supp. 2d 762, 767 
(N.D. Cal. 2011). 
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fact.28 
In Marcus v. Rodgers, a school employee used a computer after 
another employee who had not logged off of her email.29 The 
subsequent user discovered the email inbox open on the screen and 
then opened two emails where the email subject indicated that he was 
discussed.30 While he did not have to do anything to see the inbox 
contents, he did have to click on each of the two individual emails to 
see their text.31 He eventually printed and disseminated the content of 
the emails.32 Criminal charges were brought against Rodgers but 
ultimately dismissed.33 Thereafter Marcus, the owner of the email 
account, sued under New Jersey’s equivalent of the SCA.34 The trial 
court denied a motion for summary judgment and let the issue go to a 
jury.35 The jury found that Rodgers did not violate the act.36 
On appeal, the court found that Marcus could not establish that 
the defendant acted without authorization because she left her email 
account open and accessible.37 The court noted that the defendant did 
not circumvent a username or password but merely accessed what 
was open and available to him.38 This analysis implies a code-based 
approach to interpreting authorization. 
However, the court did not close the door on further analysis 
beyond the simple code-based inquiry. While the code-based 
approach appeared to resolve the first question of whether the 
defendant had authorization, the court looked further to whether the 
defendant “knowingly exceeded his authorization.”39 As to this 
second step, the court focused on the mens rea requirement: 
“plaintiffs had to establish that [Rogers] knowingly exceeded his 
                                                                                                             
28 Marcus, 2012 WL 2428046, at *5. 
29 Id. at *1. 
30 Id. at *1–2. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at *1–3. 
33 Id. at *3. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at *1. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 See id. at *5. 
39 Id. (emphasis added). 
8
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol10/iss3/4
2015] THE CODE-BASED INTERPRETATION OF AUTHORIZATION: 229 
 AN INCOMPLETE PICTURE 
authorization.”40 The court held that whether he knowingly exceeded 
his implied authorization was ultimately for the jury to determine.41 
Leaving this question to the jury speaks to the fact-based nature of 
this question and suggests that the code-based approach did not 
resolve the question completely. 
Similarly, in Doe v. City and County of San Francisco,42 the 
plaintiff sued (under the Federal SCA) after her supervisor obtained 
emails from her personal email account and tried to use them in a 
disciplinary action.43 The plaintiff’s employer provided computers on 
which the employees could check personal email.44 One of the 
defendants printed twenty-eight of Doe’s emails.45 The defendants 
claimed that Doe left these emails opened in minimized windows and 
that one of the defendants discovered them upon using the computer 
after Doe.46 Doe maintained that she did not leave these emails open 
and that one of the defendants discovered them upon a search of her 
email folders.47 
Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial court 
denied, recognizing that there was a genuine issue of material fact 
over how the defendants gained access to the emails.48 The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Doe.49 Defendants moved for a 
judgment as a matter of law, which the court denied as to the SCA 
claim.50 In denying the motion, the court recognized that the Ninth 
Circuit applies the trespass framework.51 The court also reiterated that 
there was a factual question as to how the defendants came by the 
emails, i.e., whether they were left open or not, and expressed 
                                                                                                             
40 Id. at *5–6. 
41 See id. 
42 835 F. Supp. 2d 762 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
43 Id. at 766. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 770. 
49 Doe v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. C10-04700 TEH, 2012 WL 
2132398, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2012). 
50 Id. at *3. 
51 Id. at *2–3 (citing Theofel v. Farey–Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
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skepticism as to the defendants’ story.52 
The juxtaposition of these two cases serves to highlight how 
highly fact-dependent the outcomes of these cases are. While it is 
important to note that these cases deal with different statutes in 
different jurisdictions,53 both indicate the unwillingness of courts to 
leave the question to the simple code-based approach. Ultimately, and 
despite the simple answer under the code-based approach, both courts 
left the question to the jury. 
 
B.  The Context of a Computer Shared Between Spouses 
Demonstrates the Predictive Appeal of the Code-Based 
Interpretation 
 
Feuding spouses provide another context in which questions of 
implied authorization arise. In these cases, the code-based model 
seems applicable and largely outcome-determinative. 
In White v. White,54 the wife hired a private agency to investigate 
her husband for information that she could use to obtain a divorce.55 
The agency looked at a computer that was for family use and found 
that the husband had backed up all his emails on the hard drive.56 Not 
knowing that the emails would be available without username or 
password, he did not attempt to secure the emails.57 The wife’s 
investigator copied the emails from the hard drive.58 In the resultant 
custody proceeding, the husband moved to suppress the emails, 
arguing that the private investigator accessed them in violation of 
New Jersey’s version of the SCA.59 
In denying the motion, the court briefly addressed the concept of 
authorization. It stated, “‘without authorization’ means using a 
computer from which one has been prohibited, or using another’s 
                                                                                                             
52 Id. 
53 Marcus applies the New Jersey equivalent to the SCA, while Doe applies the 
federal SCA. 
54 344 N.J. Super. Ct. 211 (2001). 
55 Id. at 215–16. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 216. 
58 Id. at 217. 
59 Id. at 214–15. 
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password or code without permission.”60 The court held that, because 
the wife had authority to access the computer, she did not violate the 
act.61 
A different factual situation arose in Miller v. Meyers.62 In Miller, 
the defendant was able to access his wife’s email account by 
installing a “key-logger” program63 on a computer primarily used by 
the wife and thereby obtained her email password.64 The court 
granted summary judgment for the wife, finding no issue of material 
fact.65 
In this context, the code-based interpretation of authorization is 
predictive. The Miller case demonstrates a code-based violation: the 
husband installed a secret program on the computer to bypass the 
code-based protections. When the court granted summary judgment 
for the wife, it implicitly affirmed the code-based model. By contrast, 
in White there was no code-based violation: the wife’s private 
investigator merely stumbled upon saved emails. An attorney could 
easily predict the outcomes for both of these cases if he or she were 
assured that the courts would apply the code-based interpretation. 
However, courts sometimes completely reject the code-based model 
in favor of the trespass model, making accurate prediction 
challenging. 
 
C.  Cases in which a Person Inadvertently Grants Permanent 
Access to Someone Else Demonstrate Courts’ Unwillingness to 
be Constrained by the Code-Based Model 
 
A third context of implied authorization occurs when a person 
inadvertently allows someone else access to his or her email system. 
In this situation, repeated access may violate the SCA. In this 
                                                                                                             
60 Id. at 221 (citing Sherman & Co. v. Salton Maxim Housewares, Inc., 94 F. 
Supp. 2d 817 (E.D. Mich. 2000)). 
61 Id. at 221. 
62 766 F. Supp. 2d 919 (W.D. Ark. 2011). 
63 A key-logger program is a program that, once installed, runs in the 
background of a computer and records every key stroke made by a user. See Oxford 
English Dictionary Online (Drft. Rev. Dec. 2012), http://www.oed.com (enter “key-
logger”; then click “go”). 
64 Miller, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 920. 
65 Id. at 923. 
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scenario, courts may reject the code-based interpretation of 
authorization in favor of the more fluid trespass theory. 
In Lazette v. Kulmatycki,66 Verizon issued Lazette, an employee, 
a BlackBerry for business and personal use.67 Verizon allowed the 
employee to check her personal Gmail account on the BlackBerry.68 
At the end of her employment, she returned the BlackBerry with all 
her personal emails deleted but without disabling or removing the 
Gmail account access.69 Subsequently, her supervisor used the 
BlackBerry and continually monitored her personal email account 
from it.70 
Lazette sued, alleging a violation of the SCA.71 The defense filed 
a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and argued that her failure to secure the 
system deprived her of a claim under the SCA.72 The court declined 
to dismiss, stating that “negligence [in failing to remove the account] 
is, however, not the same as approval, much less authorization.”73 
The court followed the trespass model, analogizing the situation to 
someone who “fails to leave the door locked when going out” as 
opposed to “one who leaves it open knowing someone [will] be 
stopping by.”74 
In another case, Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot 
Camp,75 plaintiffs brought action against defendants for theft of 
business model, violation of trademarks and copyrights, and 
breaching fiduciary duties.76 Defendants moved to exclude from 
evidence certain emails obtained in violation of the SCA.77 Mr. Fell, 
owner of the defendant corporation, left his username and password 
for his personal email account stored on his work computer, such that 
it auto-filled when an employee of plaintiff corporation accessed the 
                                                                                                             
66 949 F. Supp. 2d 748 (N.D. Ohio 2013). 
67 Id. at 751. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 751. 
72 Id. at 756. 
73 Id. at 757. 
74 Id. 
75 587 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
76 Id. at 551. 
77 Id. 
12
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol10/iss3/4
2015] THE CODE-BASED INTERPRETATION OF AUTHORIZATION: 233 
 AN INCOMPLETE PICTURE 
email account.78 
The plaintiff79 argued that authorization was implied because Fell 
left his username and password stored on the work computer.80 The 
court applied the trespass model, likening plaintiff’s conduct to 
leaving “a key to his house on the front desk [of the plaintiff’s 
corporation]” and maintained that in such a situation, “one could not 
reasonably argue that he was giving consent to whomever found the 
key, to use it to enter his house and rummage through his 
belongings.”81 The court held that there was no implied authorization 
for plaintiff’s employees to access his personal email directly from 
his Hotmail account and other accounts by using a password stored 
on plaintiff’s computers.82 
One final case does not involve inadvertence but express 
permission. In Cardinal Health 414, Inc. v. Adams,83 two employees, 
Adams and Young, exchanged their usernames and passwords so they 
could access each other’s email and other work materials when one 
was replacing the other as manager. After a couple of years, Adams 
left the company.84 Though Adam’s own username and password 
ceased to work once he left, he continued to access information on 
the employer’s server using Young’s account information.85 He 
ultimately obtained information that was proprietary in nature.86 
The company eventually sued under, inter alia, the SCA. Both 
sides moved for summary judgment. Despite the fact that Young 
freely gave Adams his username and password, the court granted 
judgment for the plaintiff, finding an SCA violation as a matter of 
law.87 The court first noted that “[c]ommon sense should have been 
sufficient to indicate to Adam that [his] behavior was wrong.”88 Then 
the court applied the trespass model: 
                                                                                                             
78 Id. at 552. 
79 The plaintiff was the non-movant for the motion. 
80 Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 559, 561. 
81 Id. at 561. 
82 Id. at 562. 
83 582 F. Supp. 2d 967, 970 (M.D. Tenn. 2008). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 970–71. 
86 Id. at 972. 
87 Id. at 977. 
88 Id. 
13
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Drawing the analogy to trespassing, it is as if, two 
years earlier, Young asked Adams to water the plants 
in his office while he was on vacation and, for this 
purpose only, Young gave Adams an extra key to his 
office. Then, two years later, after Adams left the 
company, Adams used the key to come back in the 
office, snoop around, and take some of Young’s 
work-related materials. Such conduct would clearly 
be trespassing.89 
The first two of these cases suggest that, when a person 
inadvertently leaves another individual permanent access to his or her 
password, he or she does not grant the other individual authorization 
to access the email account. The final case suggests that inadvertence 
may not even be required. In all three situations the courts 
comfortably used an analogy, likening the situation to trespass law, 
thereby applying the trespass theory of authorization. Additionally, in 
all three cases the courts implicitly rejected the code-based analysis 
by finding breach of the act for simply using the password someone 
had access to. These cases demonstrate that the code-based approach 
is insufficient. It does not provide a remedy in every situation where 
society would expect one. The trespass theory is more fluid and can 
fit these unusual cases. If Lazette, Pure Power Boot Camp, and 
Cardinal Health are any indication, courts tend to abandon the code-
based interpretation of authorization in situations where the code-
based interpretation would not provide (from the court’s perspective) 
an adequate remedy. 
 
IV. THE APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO AUTHORIZATION LOOKS TO 
BOTH THE CODE-BASED AND TRESPASS THEORIES 
 
It is important to note that the code-based and trespass approaches 
to authorization are not mutually exclusive. The predictive benefit of 
the code-based model can, at least in part, be utilized while still 
allowing a more fluid trespass model to emerge and protect 
individuals when needed. In fact, the best approach to determining 
authorization would involve both approaches working in tandem. As 
                                                                                                             
89 Id. 
14
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol10/iss3/4
2015] THE CODE-BASED INTERPRETATION OF AUTHORIZATION: 235 
 AN INCOMPLETE PICTURE 
a threshold inquiry, the courts should look to whether the defendant 
bypassed any code-based protections. If the answer to that question is 
yes then there is no need to examine trespass theories, as those 
actions would amount to a violation as a matter of law.90 If the 
answer is no then the court should still use the trespass model to see if 
it indicates a violation. This second step is in accord with the court’s 
examination of whether the defendant knowingly exceeded his or her 
authorization.91 This question will often be left to the jury, as the 
mens rea of “knowingly” is a material fact. 
This combined approached is advantageous because it preserves 
the best of both theories. The main benefit of the code-based 
approach is its predictive nature and addressing the more clear-cut 
case of hacking. Further, the advantage of the trespass model is its 
fluid nature. If the code-based theory does not establish a violation, 
the trespass model allows courts to address the normative issues that 
the code-based theory does not fully capture. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The question of authorization under the SCA is complex and 
largely fact-specific. The different interpretations of authorization 
provide the courts tools for addressing these complications. The code-
based theory of authorization, being the more popular of late, may 
seem appealing at first because it is narrower in scope, incorporates 
familiar concepts of lenity, and seemingly provides the ability to 
predict outcomes. In some circumstances, however, the courts choose 
to abandon the code-based theory where a different result seems 
appropriate based on social norms. Thus, even when no code-based 
violation seems apparent, as in Marcus, the trespass model permits 
courts to leave the issue to the jury.92 There is no bright-line rule. The 
strong predictive ability of the code-based model is valuable as one 
measure of a trespass but is not the only measure. While picking the 
lock of one’s back door makes for an easy case of trespass, walking 
through the open front door may also be a trespass under the right 
                                                                                                             
90 See, e.g., Miller v. Meyers, 766 F. Supp. 2d 919 (W.D. Ark. 2011). 
91 See, e.g., Marcus v. Rogers, A-2937-09T3, 2012 WL 2428046 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. June 28, 2012). 
92 See id. at *5. 
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facts. So too, in the computer trespass context, practitioners should be 
aware that slightly distinguishable facts can create vastly different 
outcomes. The best model would involve using aspects of both 
approaches together. Thus, a court can get some of the predictive 
ability of the code-based approach while still having the freedom to 
find violations under analogies to trespass law when the facts and 
societal norms demand it. 
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